Official Immunity and the Civil Rights Act by Theis, William H.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 38 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1976-1977 Term: A Symposium
Winter 1978
Official Immunity and the Civil Rights Act
William H. Theis
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
William H. Theis, Official Immunity and the Civil Rights Act, 38 La. L. Rev. (1978)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol38/iss2/2
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT
William H. Theis*
With increasing frequency in recent years, the Supreme Court has
confronted an important issue: the proper scope of immunity for govern-
mental officers in litigation under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.'
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. The author thanks
Professors James B. Haddad of Northwestern University and Alfred Hill of Colum-
bia University for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this article. Jay
McCrary, a 1977 graduate of the L.S.U. Law Center, provided research assistance.
1. The literature on the availability of official immunity in Civil Rights Act
litigation includes: Cochran, Civil Rights Litigation in the Fifth Circuit: Part I, 48
Miss. L.J. 377, 399-417 (1977); Horlbeck & Harkness, Executive Immunity and the
Constitutional Tort, 51 DEN. L.J. 321 (1974); Kattan, Knocking on Wood: Some
Thoughts on the Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights Damage Actions, 30
VAND. L. REV. 942 (1977); McCormack & Kirkpatrick, Immunities of State Offi-
cials Under Section 1983, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 65 (1976); Developments in the Law-
Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1209-17 (1977); Comment,
Immunity of Public Officials from Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts, 18
ARK. L. REV. 81 (1964); Comment, Civil Liability of Subordinate State Officials
Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts and the Doctrine of Official Immunity, 44 CAL.
L. REV. 887 (1956); Note, Liability of Public Officers to Suit Under the Civil Rights
Acts, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 614 (1946); Comment, Quasi-Judicial Immunity: Its Scope
and Limitations in Section 1983 Actions, 1976 DUKE L.J. 95; Comment, Federal
Comity, Official Immunity, and the Dilemma of Section 1983, 1967 DUKE L.J. 741;
Comment, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARV.
L. REV. 1229 (1955); Comment, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1953); Comment, Scheuer v. Rhodes: A Restatement of
Absolute Immunity, 60 IOWA L. REV. 191 (1974); Comment, Civil Rights-Section
1983-Prosecuting Attorney Held Immune from Civil Liability for Violation of Civil
Rights Act, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 160 (1967); Comment, Scheuer v. Rhodes; Reconcil-
ing Section 1983 Damage Actions with Governmental Immunities, 53 N.C.L. REV.
439 (1974); Comment, Accountability for Government Misconduct: Limiting Qual-
ified Immunity and the Good Faith Defense, 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 938 (1976); Note,
Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322 (1969) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Liability of Judicial Officers].
Treatment of immunity doctrine in a more general context includes: P. BATOR,
P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDER-
AL SYSTEM 1410-23 (2d ed. 1973); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§
26.01-.07 (1958, Supp. 1971); W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 335-62 (6th ed. 1974); C. RHYNE, W. RHYNE & S. ELMENDORF, TORT LIABILI-
TY AND IMMUNITY OF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS (1976); Davis, Administrative Officers'
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This article will outline two approaches to this problem of statutory
interpretation and will argue for the superiority of one over the other. The
Court's most recent decisions will be assessed within this framework; and
it will be seen that the most damning objection to them, taken as a whole,
is their incoherence, despite elaborate efforts to create a contrary illusion.
Where the Court is now heading has become virtually inscrutable. What
follows may provide some structure and perspective for a most lamentable
situation.
TENNEY v. BRANDHOVE: A METHODOLOGY OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Section 1983 speaks2 in such broad, all-encompassing terms that it
seems to impose unqualified liability on "every person" who, under color
of state law, transgresses its provisions. If immunities are to exist, they are
not found in the text of the statute. The earliest decisions of the Court did
nothing to dispel this appearance; it imposed liability on election officials
in a series of voting cases without even mention of the considerable body
of common law immunity doctrine which had grown up around these
officials.' As we shall later see,4 any consideration of common law
notions of immunity might have produced considerable amelioration of the
statutory language. In any event, if such an inquiry were mandated, the
opinions have a gaping hole, given the richness of the materials available
Tort Liability, 55 MICH. L. REV. 201 (1956); Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability
for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972); Gray, Private
Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV. 303 (1959); Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1963); James,
Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 610
(1955); Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263
(1937); Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials, 12 FORDHAM L.
REV. 130 (1943); Powell, Administrative Exercise of the Police Power, 24 HARV. L.
REV. 441 (1911).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subject-
ed, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), overruling Grovey v. Townsend,
295 U.S. 45 (1935); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S.
73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). The Court had avoided the issue
of judicial immunity in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
4. See notes 35-41, 59-61, infra, and accompanying text.
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for consideration. Indeed, as recently as 1944, the Court, in Snowden v.
Hughes,' hinted that immunities might not be engrafted on the "every
person" language. Following Snowden, some notable lower court opin-
ions explicitly rejected a consideration of common law immunity doctrines
and insisted on a literal application of the "every person" language. 6
In 1951, the Court, under Mr. Justice Frankfurter, brought this trend
to an abrupt halt. In Tenney v. Brandhove,7 a civil action against members
of a state legislature, the Court declared that the "every person" language
did not work a wholesale abrogation of the immunities recognized at
common law. The Congress, some of whose members now appear un-
worthy of the label "Radical Republicans," could not have intended such
a drastic change as the elimination of legislative immunity, which the
Court characterized as "well-grounded in history and reason."' Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion took great pains to establish the proposition
that legislative immunity had "taproots in the Parliamentary struggles of
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries." 9 This strong tradition, trans-
planted to the colonies, flourished and found eloquent expression in
American law' 0 long before and continuing up to 1871, the date of the
passage of the Act. Thus, "[w]e cannot believe that Congress-itself a
staunch advocate of legislative freedom-would impinge on a tradition so
well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general
language before us." "
Clearly, the Court's holding is no literal reading of the statutory
language; such a course would lead in a totally different direction. 2 Nor
does the Court rely on direct evidence of Congressional intent as found in
5. 321 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1944).
6. See McShane v. Moldovon, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949); Picking v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir.), rehearing denied, 152 F.2d 753 (1945).
7. 341 U.S. 367 (1951), noted in 3 MERCER L. REV. 221 (1951), 30 TEX. L. REV.
516 (1952), 20 U. CIN. L. REV. 511 (1951).
8. 341 U.S. at 376.
9. Id. at 372.
10. See, e.g., Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. (4 Tyng) 1, 27 (1808), quoted at 341
U.S. at 373-74.
11. 341 U.S. at 376.
12. The criminal analogue to section 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970), is notlimited
by notions of immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976). In both
statutes, the language is equally plain. Significantly, the original wording of section
1983, before codification, imposed liability on "any person ..... any . . . law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary not-
withstanding." Act of April 20, 1871, Stat. 1, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
1978]
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legislative history.' 3 Rather, disbelief that Congress could have intended
to act so irresponsibly generates an assumption that Congress must have
intended to make no major change in a long-established and salutary
doctrine like legislative immunity. 4
If one has any doubts that Tenney required an inquiry into pre-1871
law in order to fathom the intent of Congress, Pierson v. Ray, s15 a later
case upholding immunity for judges, should resolve those doubts. Explic-
itly noting cases 16 for which one can trace a genealogy dating back to
1607,' 7 the Court declared, "Few doctrines were more solidly established
at common law than the immunity of judges from liability from damages
for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.' ' 18 Hence, only a
strong tradition---obviously known to the legislators and, therefore, obvi-
ously not intended to be discarded-can ameliorate the starkness of the
legislative language.
Reliance on this methodology worked smoothly in Tenney and in
Pierson because one might confidently discover and describe the state of
pre-1871 law on the narrow issues involved. However, difficulties arise
when one cannot find virtual unanimity in pre-1871 law on the immunity
of a particular class of government officials. One could easily imagine a
situation in which a search of pre-1871 law would reveal that the cases
were mixed on the question of immunity for a particular class of officials.
Perhaps even more likely, given the proliferation of government officials
in the last four decades, no pre-1871 cases dealing with the immunity of a
particular class of officials might be found.
Two approaches to these situations come to mind. (1) Immunity will
13. The legislative history materials are none too promising for the support of
immunity doctrine, especially beyond that for legislators. See Littleton v. Berbling,
468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1974); Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights
Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 N.W.U. L. REv. 615, 621-23 (1970); Liability
of Judicial Officers, supra note 1, at 325-29.
14. Unless we indulge in the assumption that the Court intended to impose its
will upon that of Congress, without any deference to the statute, the immunity
described in Tenney must be grounded in history as well as in policy. The Court
does not seem to arrogate for itself a privilege to make forays into good policy that
would have been unacceptable to the 1871 legislators.
15. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
16. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872); Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3
Ex. 220 (1868).
17. Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1607), discussed in text accom-
panying notes 22-24, infra, is the foundation of Anglo-American judicial immunity.
18. 386 U.S. at 553-54.
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be granted only if the government official can demonstrate a strong
tradition of immunity for government officials who bore the same title or
performed the same duties. If the pre-1871 cases are mixed or non-
existent, immunity will be denied. (2) Immunity will be granted whenever
the official can demonstrate a strong tradition of immunity for a different
class of officials performing different duties (which, with Tenney and
Pierson in the background, he can likely accomplish) and, in addition, he
can demonstrate that the reasons for granting immunity to the former class
apply equally well to his class of officials. Even though pre-1871 law may
give no clear idea of the immunity for a particular class of officials,
immunity may be extended on analogous grounds to various classes of
officials.
Certainly, the second of the two approaches suggested by this author,
the appeal to analogy, has more surface appeal. It emphasizes intelligent
assessment of the policies behind immunity doctrine, not the excavation of
long-forgotten precedents, which, even if found, may be employed in a
rigid fashion. 19 Judicial recognition that immunity doctrine can evolve
would parallel the judicial recognition that the constitutional rights protect-
ed under the Act can evolve. A flexible, enlightened view of immunity
would complement a flexible, enlightened view of constitutional rights. 20
19. See Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1215-17 (5th Cir. 1976) (Brown, Ch. J.,
concurring).
20. Over the past twenty years, the federal courts have greatly expanded the
constitutional rights to be protected. First, they have taken traditional restraints on
governmental action, recognized at common law and in the Bill of Rights, and have
incorporated them into the fourteenth amendment and, from there, into section
1983. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). And, even more radically,
they have incorporated protections not known at common law. See O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). For a
general treatment of these issues, see Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in Four-
teenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
Indifferent to the rightness or wrongness of conduct, immunity remains a
separate issue from the unconstitutionality of conduct. Hence, the methodology of
immunity doctrine may plausibly differ from the method of determining whether
there has been a violation of constitutional rights. The cases have not always
maintained a clear distinction. See Quails v. Parrish, 534 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976);
Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975).
Significantly, history has a weaker force in determining whether conduct is
unconstitutional than, it will be argued, in determining whether immunity should be
granted. Although certain conduct, historically, might have been considered a
tortious intrusion on personal or property rights, it is not necessarily unconstitution-
al conduct. See Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1974). When the issues and
the appropriate methodologies are confused, the demands of history on immunity




Indeed, a companion section of section 1983 mandates resort to the
"common law" when the statutory framework leaves gaps to be filled. 2'
If we are to admit that the "every person" language sets the outer
boundaries of liability, but does not restrict judicially created defenses, as
Tenney assures us, then immunity is one of those gaps to be filled by the
common law, broadly conceived, not the law as it existed at a particular
time.
On the other hand, an historical consideration of immunity doctrine
indicates that the second approach would run counter to legislative intent.
The common law as known in 1871 did not embrace a general theory of
immunity, although the possibilities of such a development were by no
means unconsidered. Certainly, the creation of such a doctrine could have
easily been effected by the courts. Indeed, at the turn of the nineteenth
century, the common law took a sharp turn toward a more generalized
public officer immunity. The arguments employed on behalf of immunity
were not and cannot be confined to a particular class of officials, and laid
claim to an ever-increasing domain. The inherent expansiveness of im-
munity doctrine raises a serious problem. Although "every person" may
not mean "every person," the language surely does not mean, on the
other hand, "no person" or "very few persons." If the federal courts
emphasize the rationale behind immunity doctrine and, in common law
fashion, grant immunity whenever the analogy to judges or legislators-to
take the most notable examples-can be drawn, then they may nullify the
plain meaning of the statute. Unless we "freeze" the law, with 1871 as
the point of deposit into cold storage, then we shall eventually reach the
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts
by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons
in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be
exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far
as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where
they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary
to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law,
as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein
the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the
same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the
cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the
party found guilty.
For commentary on this statute, see Theis, Shaw v. Garrison: Some Observations
on 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Federal Common Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 681 (1976); Note,
Choice of Law Under Section 1983, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1970). See also Shaw v.
Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. La. 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1977).
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absurd conclusion that Congress intended to grant wholesale immunity by
its subtle choice of the words "every person."
ENGLISH COMMON LAW
English law very early recognized the absolute immunity of legis-
lators, judges of courts of record, and jurors. Analogical efforts to estab-
lish absolute immunity for other officials met with no success. Although
precedents may be found in favor of a qualified immunity for certain
officials, they do not support any generalizations about the availability of
even a qualified immunity in favor of government officials as a group. In
any event, the real contest, if any, lay between no immunity and qualified
immunity. Absolute immunity, no matter how compelling the logic might
seem, was historically quite limited.
Quite early, in Floyd v. Barker,22 the Court of Star Chamber estab-
lished the immunity of grand jurors, petit jurors, and judges in proceedings
in courts of record. As for the immunity of judges, the opinion rests on
two reasons: (1) An action against a judge of a court of record would
involve an attack on the record of proceedings in his court. Although the
opinion quaintly speaks about the "sublimity" of records, it might be
more straightforward to say that an appeal was considered to be the only
remedy for the aggrieved suitor. Collateral actions should not subvert the
integrity of the appellate process. (2) Since the judge is the personal
extension of the king and charged to do justice in his name, only the king
should entertain any charges against the judge. If any but the king should
hear these charges, justice would be scandalized and subverted. Neverthe-
less, the opinion preserves the writ of false judgment to be taken against a
court not of record. 23 Moreover, even a judge of a court of record could be
held liable for acts in excess of his jurisdiction. 24
After the historic pronouncement in Floyd v. Barker on judicial
immunity, other officials sought to gain cover under the doctrine, even
though they did not bear the literal title of judge. The early efforts in Terry
v. Huntington25 produced modest, innocuous results. The Court of Exche-
quer conceded that commissioners of excise resemble judges, but judges
of courts of limited jurisdiction. If they imposed an excise on items not
excisable, they exceeded their jurisdiction and lost their immunity. Obvi-
22. 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1607).
23. Id. at 1307.
24. See Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1613).
25. 145 Eng. Rep. 557 (Exch. Ch. 1680).
1978]
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ously, an immunity only for acts within a jurisdiction so narrowly
conceived was not a very potent defense.26 And even this immunity seems
to have been reserved for decision-makers whose acts were truly delibera-
tive, that is, made after a formal taking of evidence.
Later efforts to analogize lottery officials,27 the secretary of state,2 8
and a colonial governor 29 to judges of courts of record met with failure.
The judges were not indifferent to the possibilities of harassing suits
against government officials.30 Nor would they disagree that government
officials other than themselves might be called upon to make decisions,
based on the facts and the law, fully as difficult as those entrusted to
judges. 3' And, finally, in most instances, procedural devices other than a
suit for consequential damages were available to assure responsible deci-
sion-making. Nonetheless, the judges held firm the rigid32 line of Floyd v.
Barker against persistent efforts to transplant the absolute immunity which
they enjoyed. 33
There are, to be sure, crosscurrents in the stream of decisions.
Opinions may be found which suggest the existence of something akin to
(but not the same as) the "qualified immunity" developed in recent
decisions of our Court. 34 In Ashby v. White, 35 plaintiff sued an election
official for wrongfully refusing his vote in a parliamentary election. The
Court of King's Bench refused him an action, Chief Justice Holt dissent-
26. American courts eventually developed the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine,
so that it offered little protection for the government officer. See Miller v. Horton,
152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891) (per Holmes, J.); Davis, supra note I, at 222-27;
Jennings, supra note I, at 281-89.
27. Schinotti v. Bumsted, 101 Eng. Rep. 750 (K.B. 1796).
28. Entick v. Carrington, 17 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765).
29. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1775).
30. See Miller v. Seare, 96 Eng. Rep. 673, 674 (C.P. 1777).
31. See, e.g., Barry v. Arnaud, 113 Eng. Rep. 245 (K.B. 1839); Isaac v. Impey,
109 Eng. Rep. 514 (K.B. 1830); Warne v. Varley, 101 Eng. Rep. 639 (K.B. 1795);
Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1775); Terry v. Huntington, 145 Eng.
Rep. 557 (Ex. 1680).
32. Kemp v. Neville, 142 Eng. Rep. 556 (C.P. 1861); Calder v. Halket, 13 Eng.
Rep. 12 (P.C. 1840); Garnett v. Ferrand, 198 Eng. Rep. 576 (K.B. 1827); Schinotti v.
Bumsted, 101 Eng. Rep. 750 (K.B. 1796); Groenvelt v. Burwell, 91 Eng. Rep. 1202
(K.B. 1699); Hamond v. Howell, 86 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1677).
33. "The judge has truly been the pampered child of the law .... "Gray,
supra note I, at 309.
34. The nature of the latter immunity is explored in the text accompanying
notes 73-95, infra.
35. 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703).
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ing. A variety of reasons were given: (1) The official was a judge or
"quasi a judge" (adhered to by only two judges). (2) Plaintiff had lost no
protectable legal right. (3) The decision of election disputes rested solely,
at least as a matter of first instance, with parliament. Holt dissented,
stating on the matter of most interest for our purposes, "[i]f publick
officers will infringe mens rights they ought to pay greater damages than
other men, to deter and hinder other officers from the like offences."
36
Clearly, he rejected an expansive view of immunity for government
officials.
On appeal, his position prevailed; and the House of Lords reversed
King's Bench, 37 a decision which produced a strongly worded resolution
of the House of Commons against interference with its perogatives .38 The
House of Lords responded with its own resolutions.19 Construing these
36. Id. at 137.
37. 1 Bro. P.C. 45, 1 Eng. Rep. 417 (H.L. 1703).
38. Id. at 47-48, 1 Eng. Rep. at 418-19.
39. Id. at 49-50, 1 Eng. Rep. at 420-21. Since these resolutions are not a part of
the more commonly available report of the case found in I Eng. Rep. 417 (H.L.
1703), they are reprinted below:
That by the known laws of this kingdom, every freeholder, or other
person, having a right to give his vote at the election of Members to serve in
Parliament, and, being wilfully denied or hindered so to do, by the officer who
ought to receive the same; may maintain an action in the Queen's courts against
such officer to assert his right, and recover damages for the injury. 2dly, That
the asserting, that a person, having a right to give his vote at an election, and,
being hindered so to do by the officer who ought to take the same, is without
remedy for such wrong, by the ordinary course of law; is distructive of the
property of the subject, against the freedom of elections, and manifestly tends
to encourage corruption and partiality in officers, who are to make returns to
Parliament, and to subject the freeholders, and other electors, to their arbitrary
will and pleasure. 3dly, That the declaring Matthew Ashby guilty of a breach of
privilege of the House of Commons, for prosecuting an action against the
Constables of Aylesbury, for not receiving his vote at an election, after he had,
in the known and proper methods of law, obtained a judgment in Parliament for
recovery of his damages; is an unprecedented attempt upon the judicature of
Parliament, and is, in effect, to subject the law of England to the votes of the
House of Commons. 4thly, That the deterring electors from prosecuting ac-
tions in the ordinary course of law, where they are deprived of their right of
voting and terryfying attornies, solicitors, counsellors, and serjeants of law,
from soliciting, prosecuting, and pleadings, in such cases, by voting their so
doing to be a breach of privilege of the House of Commons, is a manifest
assuming a power; to controul the law, to hinder the course of justice, and
subject the property of Englishmen to the arbitrary votes of the House of
Commons. (Resolution of March 27, 1704)
1st That neither House of Parliament hath any power, by any vote or
declaration to create to themselves any new privilege, that is not warranted by
19781
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latter resolutions, English courts in later cases against election officials' °
drew the conclusion that the House of Lords' decision placed critical
reliance on the plaintiff's allegation that defendant acted willfully. And,
by "willfully," these courts meant that the defendant must act with
subjective knowledge that he is violating the plaintiff's rights.4 Thus, an
election official might fare better than a judge of a court of limited
jurisdiction. One case, with some quotable language of broad effect,
carries this requirement of willfulness beyond election disputes. 42 How-
ever, it would unduly emphasize the exceptions over the general rule to
the known laws and customs of Parliament. 2dly, That every freeman of
England, who apprehends himself to be injured, has a right to seek redress by
action at law; and that the commencing and prosecuting an action at common
law against any person (not entitled to privilege of Parliament) is no breach of
the privilege of Parliament. 3dly, That the House of Commons, in committing
to Newgate, Daniel Home, Henry Bass, and John Paton, junior, John Paly,
and John Oviatt, for commencing and prosecuting an action at common law,
against the late constables of Aylesbury, for not allowing their votes in election
of Members to Serve in Parliament; upon pretence that their so doing was
contrary to a declaration, a contempt of the jurisdiction, and a breach of the
privilege of that House; have assumed to themselves alone a legislative authori-
ty, by pretending to attribute the force of a law to their declaration; having
claimed a jurisdiction not warranted by the constitution; and having assumed a
new privilege, to which they can shew no title by the law and custom of
Parliament; and having thereby as far as in them lies, subjected the rights of
Englishmen, and the freedom of their persons, to the arbitrary votes of the
House of Commons. 4thly, That every Englishman who is imprisoned, by any
authority, whatsoever, has an undoubted right, by his agents or friends, to
apply for, and obtain a writ of habeas corpus, in order to procure his liberty by
due course of law. 5thly, That for the House of Commons to censure or punish
any person, for assisting a prisoner to procure a writ of habeas corpus, or, by
vote or otherwise, to deter men from soliciting, prosecuting, or, pleading upon,
such writ of habeas corpus, in behalf of such prisoner; is an attempt of
dangerous consequence, a breach of the many good statutes provided for the
liberty of the subject, and of pernicious example, by denying the necessary
assistance to the prisoner, upon a commitment of the House of Commons,
which has ever been allowed upon all commitments by any authority whatsoev-
er. 6thly, That a writ of error is not a writ of grace, but of right; and ought not
to be denied to the subject, when duly applied for, though at the request of
either House of Parliament; the denial thereof being an obstruction of justice,
contrary to Magna Charta. (Resolution of February 27, 1705).
40. See Tozer v. Child, 119 Eng. Rep. 1286 (Exch. Ch. 1857); Harman v.
Tappenden, 102 Eng. Rep. 214 (K.B. 1801); Cullen v. Morris, 171 Eng. Rep. 741
(N.P. 1819). But see Sterling v. Turner, 86 Eng. Rep. 139 (K.B. 1684), approved in
Ferguson v. Earl of Kinnoull, 8 Eng. Rep. 412, 423 (H.L. 1842).
41. If one studies the Lords' resolutions, reprinted in note 39, supra, this
conclusion seems erroneous.
42. Harman v. Tappenden, 102 Eng. Rep. 214 (K.B. 1801).
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say that government officials, apart from election officials, had even a
qualified immunity.4 3
AMERICAN COMMON LAW BEFORE 1871
If one can make any generalization about American law before 1871,
he would conclude that it did not favor official immunity. Judges44 and
legislators45 received their absolute immunity, as in England; but even the
United States Supreme Court, as late as 1868, was willing to grant an
action against a judge of a court of record if he acted maliciously. 46 Most
other officials, especially those in law enforcement, 47 were held account-
able for misconduct as measured by the pertinent legal rules,48 even in the
difficult case of an official relying on an unconstitutional statute. 49 Some-
times the official's duties could be fairly demanding; 50 occasionally, lax in
a sense difficult for us to conceive. 5 1 But, under the common view, one
performed his legal duty or paid damages. Some few were held account-
able for their mistakes only if they acted maliciously.52 Judges were not
insensitive to the hardships of official accountability; but, significantly,
the leading cases granting relief from the rigors of this accountability were
43. See Ferguson v. Earl of Kinnoull, 8 Eng. Rep. 412 (H.L. 1842); Green v.
Buckkles-Churches, 74 Eng. Rep. 294 (C.P. 1589). See generally Gray, supra note
1, at 324.
44. E.g., Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. 1810).
45. E.g., Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. (4 Tyng) 1 (1808).
46. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868), which was superseded by
the more traditional view in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
47. This tradition is recounted in Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for
Police Deprivations of Individual Rights, 59 MINN. L. REV. 991 (1975).
48. See Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1865); Tracy v. Swartwout, 35
U.S. (10 Pet.) 80 (1836); Dunlop v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 242 (1812); Little v.
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Engdahl, supra note 1, at 14-21; James,
supra note 1, at 635.
49. If the oppression be in the exercise of unconstitutional powers, then
the functionaries who wield them, are amenable for their injurious acts to
the judicial tribunals of the country, at the suit of the oppressed.
2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1676
(4th ed. T. Cooley 1873). See further Rapacz, Protection of Officers Who Act Under
Unconstitutional Statutes, 11 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1927); Field, The Effect of an
Unconstitutional Statute in the Law of Public Officers: Liability of Officer for
Action or Nonaction, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 155 (1928).
50. See Teall v. Felton, 1 N.Y. 537 (1848), aff'd, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1851),
discussed in text accompanying notes 62-64, infra.
51. See Dwinnels v. Parsons, 98 Mass. 470 (1868).
52. See the cases involving school officials discussed in the text accompanying
note 88, infra.
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premised on what were conceived to be legislative modifications of the
common law.
Decisions from New York provide striking examples. Although the
analogy to judicial immunity was urged in Seaman v. Patten,53 a case
against a meat inspector, the court's decision clearly rests upon its conclu-
sion that the relevant statute granted him unfettered discretion in his
decision-making. 54 The court does not grant him immunity for tortious
conduct. Rather, it finds the scope of wrong-doing rather narrow. Since
the inspector has no statutory standards for judging good meat from bad,
his decision to approve or disapprove meat may be reviewed only for
corruptness of motivation.
Tax assessors in Weaver v. Deavendorf,"5 a leading case, are said to
make "judicial determinations." They deliberate and make decisions after
the presentation of evidence by the citizen, who may seek judicial review
without resort to a damage suit. 56 However, mistakes with respect to the
limits of their "jurisdiction" will lead to liability, a perilous qualification
to their immunity. 57 And a later case stresses that the relevant statute
merely charges them to use good judgment "according to the best infor-
mation in their power' '-not to make correct decisions as retrospectively
viewed.5
Jenkins v. Waldron59 grants immunity to voting officials. Direct
precedential reliance is placed on Ashby v. White, the English case
mentioned earlier, which also involved election officials.' ° And a later
53. 2 Cai. R. 312 (N.Y. 1805).
54. Accord, Wilson v. Mayor, 1 Denio 595 (N.Y. 1845); Vanderheyden v.
Young, 11 Johns. 150 (N.Y. 1814). Nor was the "unfettered discretion" analysis a
phenomenon limited to New York. See Ferguson v. Earl of Kinnoull, 8 Eng. Rep.
412 (H.L. 1842); Bassett v. Godschall, 95 Eng. Rep. 967 (K.B. 1770). And it has
respectability in other American jurisdictions. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 89 (1849); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827); Downer v.
Lent, 6 Cal. 94 (1856).
55. 3 Denio 117 (N.Y. 1846).
56. See Barhyte v. Shepherd, 35 N.Y. 238, 251 (1866); accord, Wall v. Trum-
bull, 16 Mich. 228 (1867) (per Cooley, J.).
57. See Mygatt v. Washburn, 15 N.Y. 316 (1857); People v. Supervisors, I1
N.Y. 563 (1854). Later cases better illustrate the dangers of the "jurisdictional"
exception to immunity. Compare Williams v. Weaver, 75 N.Y. 30 (1878), with
National Bank of Chemung v. City of Elmira, 53 N.Y. 49 (1873).
58. See Barhyte v. Shepherd, 35 N.Y. 238, 253-54 (1866).
59. 11 Johns. 114 (N.Y. 1814); contra, Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. (1 I Tyng)
350 (1814); Jeffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio 372 (1842).
60. See note 35, supra, and accompanying text.
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New York case6 1 puts forth the same sort of justification found in the tax
assessor cases: the citizen has a right to the best, honest efforts of the
officials, not correct decisions.
That these cases rest on the nature of the discretion entrusted by
statute to the officials is underlined in Teal v. Felton.62 The plaintiff
brought suit over an excessive postal rate levied by the local postmaster.
Upholding the plaintiff's contention, the New York court observed that the
pertinent federal statute set out the rates of postage for various classes of
mail, not the rates for materials which seemed to the postmaster to fit
within the various classes of mail. If Congress wished to make the
postmaster the final arbiter on rates to be charged on individual pieces of
mail, it should amend the statute. 63 Of course, the judicial view of
immunity would be a false issue if the courts regularly established offi-
cials' duties in such a way that immunity would be superfluous. Teal
indicates that the courts viewed public officers' duties and immunities as a
statutory problem. 6
4
AMERICAN LAW TAKES A NEW ROAD
In 1896, the Court began, perhaps even unwittingly, the attack on
official accountability. In Spalding v. Vilas,65 the plaintiff sued the
postmaster-general for communicating to numerous clients of the former
that, under Act of Congress, certain assignments they had made to the
plaintiff might be invalid. As might have been expected, the Court found
no tortious conduct in the defendant's giving an accurate statement of the
law to interested parties. The plaintiff pressed further, arguing that even if
defendant had not exceeded the scope of his authority, he had acted
maliciously. The postmaster, it was claimed, had converted a normally
61. Goetcheus v. Matthewson, 61 N.Y. 420, 434-35, 440 (1873).
62. 1 N.Y. 537 (1848), aff'd, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1851); accord, Robinson v.
Chamberlain, 34 N.Y. 389, 395 (1866). The Supreme Court's disposition is strikingly
at odds with its broad language in Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87, 96-98
(1845). For an assessment of Kendall, see Engdahl, supra note 1, at 47-49.
63. See I N.Y. at 547-49. The Supreme Court appears to take the same ap-
proach. See 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 291. Cf. Goetcheus v. Matthewson, 61 N.Y. 420,
434-35 (1875); Doswell v. Impey, 107 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1823); Green v. Buckkles-
Churches, 74 Eng. Rep. 294 (C.P. 1589). In 1863, the Congress felt compelled to
grant absolute immunity to those executing official orders in the conduct of the
Civil War. 12 Stat. 755. Were the general presumption in favor of official immunity,
this statute would have been unnecessary.
64. Accord, Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89 (1849).
65. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
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legal act into a wrongful act because of his spiteful, malicious desire to
harm the plaintiff. The Court rejected this "prima facie tort" theory,66
analogizing heads of executive departments to judges of courts of record.
The Court, expressing the fear that later inquiry into motives would
''seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public af-
fairs," granted absolute immunity.
This borrowed consideration, especially telling in a prima facie tort
case, in which malice is the thrust of liability and can be so easily alleged
but not so easily proved or dispelled, shortly thereafter took hold in a more
general way in a series of decisions issuing from the District of Colum-
bia, 67 where most litigation against federal officers was concentrated. If
immunity was necessary to the fearless and, hence, effective performance
of the postmaster's duties, so also did it become recognized as necessary
for a host of other officials, even when they performed activities allegedly
wrongful quite apart from any malicious motivation behind them. With the
choice so limited-immunity versus no immunity-and the policy values
so phrased-over-all benefit to society versus the dismissal of a very small
number of meritorious claims-this development should not have proved
unexpected. Thus, by 1959, in Barr v. Matteo,68 the Court granted
immunity to a federal officer holding a post much lower than cabinet rank.
The rationale adopted by four members was by now familiar: not the
official's rank, but the public's need for his undivided time, attention, and
loyalty.
69
66. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 5 (4th ed. 1971) contains a
discussion of the theory and collects the cases.
67. The cases are collected, and the trend is analyzed in K. DAVIS, supra note
1, § 26.01; W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, supra note 1, at 348-55; Gray, supra note 1, at
335-42.
68. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
69. Learned Hand has penned the most frequently quoted formulation.
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal
motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the
injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such
complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justifica-
tion for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well
founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the
innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable
danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or
the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and
again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a
mistake, in the fact of which an official may later find himself hard put to it to
satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must indeed be means of punishing public
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This line of cases, confined to suits against federal officers, has not
had great influence with state courts in their handling of claims under state
law against state officers. 7° As mentioned earlier, it had no effect on early
claims against state officers under section 1983.71 When immunity doc-
trine was first introduced in Tenney, the Court proceeded on a legislative-
intent approach, not on the policy-oriented approach of Spalding .72 The
cases of the 1960s and the 1970s provided an excellent opportunity to test
the limits of Tenney and Spalding.
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN SEARCH OF A PATTERN
Scheuer v. Rhodes73 presented the first opportunity to test these
limits. Parents of students killed by national guard soldiers during an
alleged civil insurrection sued the state governor, the president of the state
university where the shooting occurred, and national guard officers and
enlisted men. Plaintiffs questioned the propriety of deploying any soldiers
at all, and also challenged specific unjustified acts of the soldiers. 74 All of
these defendants had successfully claimed in the courts below an executive
immunity of the Spalding variety. 75
The Court began its analysis by observing that executive immunity,
like judicial immunity, has grown through judicial, not legislative, devel-
opment and that the fundamental policy consideration has been to foster
independent, fearless public administration. Nonetheless, the Court
seemed fully cognizant that Spalding leaves almost no room for official
accountability. It feared that to transplant Spalding into section 1983
litigation would render that section meaningless, at least for the legal relief
permitted by that statute. Faced with this dilemma, it reached out for what
it called "qualified immunity."
officers who have been truant to their duties; but that is quite another matter
from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has
suffered from their errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found in
a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it
has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by
dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant
dread of retaliation. Judged as res nova, we should not hesitate to follow the
path laid down in the books.
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
70. See Gray, supra note 1, at 342-47.
71. See notes 3-6, supra, and accompanying text.
72. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Tenney makes no mention of Spalding.
73. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).




[A] qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch
of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances
as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which
liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable
grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for
qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the
course of official conduct .76
At any trial of plaintiffs' allegations, the standard would be applied to the
governor's decision to call out the national guard and to all higher-ranking
defendants' activities during the deployment of the national guard. As for
"lesser officers and enlisted personnel," the jury must determine whether
they acted in "good-faith obedience to the orders of their superiors." 77
This qualified immunity was found consistent with the separate
holding in Pierson v. Ray,78 discussed above for its holding on judicial
immunity. Pierson also held that a policeman could not be liable for false
arrest if he had probable cause to believe that a statute had been violated
and had no reason to believe that the statute would later be held unconstitu-
tional, as had happened in the Pierson series of events .79 Scheuer's
reading of Pierson exhibits creativity of the highest order. In Pierson the
Court dealt with a difficult application of probable cause doctrine and held
that, under tightly defined criteria, an arrest might be no violation of
constitutional rights even though made in reliance on a statute ultimately
discovered to be unconstitutional. It did not embrace a general theory of
reasonableness--diffuse and undefined-for police officers 80 nor, certain-
ly, for all executive officials. Any suggestion in Scheuer that Pierson
embodies a long-established common law doctrine applying to all officials
is totally misleading, as reconsideration of an earlier part of this paper
would demonstrate.
76. 416 U.S. at 247-48.
77. Id. at 250.
78. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
79. Pierson is discussed in greater detail in Theis, supra note 47, at 1000-05.
80. A number of courts, following the lead of the Second Circuit in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d
Cir. 1972), have adopted such a reading of Pierson for police misconduct cases. See
Theis, supra. note 47, at 1007-09. Significantly, the Second Circuit took this misin-
terpretation of Pierson to avoid the absolute immunity of Spalding.
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It is a pity that, since the Court was concerned about the wholesale
immunization of executive officers, it did not consider the common law
materials available to the 1871 legislators. Admittedly, not many cases
deal with use of military force in a setting of civilian insurrection, claimed
or actual. However, it seems reasonably clear that the initial decision
whether or not to use military force was not one reviewable by the
courts.81 On the other hand, the courts did impose rules governing the
manner in which military force was used.82 The distinction assumes some
importance for the chief executive officer of a state or city: he is liable for
his own misdeeds in directing the military forces once they are mobilized.
On the other hand, he has no vicarious liability for all the misdeeds of
military forces merely because he made an unreasonable decision to
invoke their aid in the first place.
Nor might those under his control guide their conduct by an amor-
phous reasonableness,8 3 including obedience to all orders, legal and illeg-
al. Quite clearly, obedience to an illegal order or performance of an illegal
act could lead to liability, regardless of good faith.84
Scheuer reverses these crucial propositions by suggesting that the
basic decision to employ military force may result in liability for the
governor and that subordinates may take cover under his orders. Viewed
historically, the all-embracing test of "reasonableness" proposed by the
court is both too harsh and too lenient.
Viewed as a problem of statutory analysis, Scheuer may suffer from
the same deficiencies as Spalding. The Court evidently thought it had
solved its problems by according all executive officers no more than its
newly created "qualified immunity." Although this qualified immunity,
seemingly unknown to the Court, created or assumed in that case a basis of
liability where none had previously existed, it is a doctrine only slightly
81. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 19 (1827); Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 121 (1855); Vanderheyden v.
Young, 11 Johns. 150 (N.Y. 1814); Druecker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621 (1867).
82. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass. (5
Gray) 121 (1855).
83. Although military personnel may not have been bound at all times by the
same principles of law applicable to civilians, there were principles of definite,
albeit different, content. See Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 121
(1855).
84. See Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851); Wise v. Withers, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 330 (1806); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Johnson
v. Jones, 44 I11. 142 (1867); Hyde v. Melvin, 11 Johns. 521 (N.Y. 1814).
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less expansive than that found in Spalding. The concluding passages of
the Court's opinion lay great stress upon the "good faith" of the defend-
ants as the heart of their defense.8 5 With so much emphasis on the
defendants' good faith, the plaintiff might have an exceedingly difficult
time in establishing recovery. In Scheuer, the governor and higher offi-
cials could easily claim that they were misled by their subordinates, even
innocently, into making certain orders; the subordinates could even more
easily claim they were merely following orders, which they had no
occasion to question. The opinion legitimizes two of the worst failings of
bureaucracy: uncritical transmission of "data"-surmise and conjecture
masquerading as fact 6-and uncritical obedience to orders and customary
procedures. Since even under Scheuer some officials theoretically might
be subject to liability, whether Scheuer comes too close to nullification of
section 1983 is a question of judgment; but a sound judgment would
consider nullification accomplished.
Ironically, although this conception of immunity could immunize so
many persons as to make the statute meaningless, it would not preclude, as
would Spalding, consideration of plaintiff's case in any detailed fashion.
Thus, it brings the worst of both worlds, plaintiffs uncompensated for
genuine wrongs and official defendants plagued with harassing suits.
Even if the Scheuer standard is an objective one, it too hastily and
too loosely imposes a reasonableness standard on all officials. It fails to
acknowledge that some officials traditionally had no duty toward some
plaintiffs and, more dangerously, that other officials had a more par-
ticularized or even a more stringent duty than due care toward other
plaintiffs. To return to the example of the policeman, it makes a difference
whether he must arrest upon probable cause or merely be reasonable in
making an arrest. Unless Scheuer makes no change in the law, mistaken,
but not unreasonable, judgment may substitute for the judgment required
by a probable cause standard. Even the latter standard, as developed in the
numerous precedents, does not call for perfection in judgment. Thus,
Scheuer seems to call for the generation of a new body of precedent,
which in some vague, undefined way will impose a lesser standard upon
the officer, at least in civil actions.87
The Court must have felt some difficulty with Scheuer because it so
85. 416 U.S. at 250.
86. See Oakley v. City of Pasadena, 535 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1976); Bryan v.
Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1976).
87. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
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quickly returned to the problem in Wood v. Strickland,88 a suit against
school administrators. Ironically, the common law view in 1871, probably
influenced by the unpaid, voluntary status of many school officials, held
school officials to minimal accountability. They could violate with impu-
nity a student's legal rights unless they did so with a subjective knowledge
that they were injuring him. Pre-1871 decisions stand for the proposition
that school board members can be mistaken, even badly mistaken, as long
as they bear no personal animus toward their charge.89 Of course, the more
gross their claimed ignorance, the more probable the personal animus
masquerading as ignorance. But no accurate statement of pre-1871 law
would place on them the duty to be aware of "settled, indisputable' '9
constitutional rights.
Wood ignored this tradition as well as the main thrust of the decision
in Scheuer in holding that,
The official must himself be acting sincerely and with a belief that he
is doing right, but an act violating a student's constitutional rights can
be no more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable
law on the part of one entrusted with supervision of students' daily
lives than by the presence of actual malice. To be entitled to a special
exemption from the categorical remedial language of § 1983 in a case
in which his action violated a student's constitutional rights, a school
board member, who has voluntarily undertaken the task of supervis-
ing the operation of the school and the activities of the students, must
be held to a standard of conduct based not only on permissible
intentions, but also on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitu-
tional rights of his charges. 91
That good faith is merely necessary, but not sufficient to defeat a claim is a
significant change in emphasis from Scheuer. More importantly, Wood
illustrates the Court's desire to make officials abide by standards more
specific than Scheuer's diffuse reasonableness. Wood tested the defend-
ants' specific decision under a substantive due process standard akin to
88. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
89. See Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854); Spear v. Cummings, 40 Mass.
(23 Pick.) 224 (1839); Stephenson v. Hall, 14 Barb. 222 (N.Y. 1852); Stewart v.
Southard, 17 Ohio 402 (1848). Later decisions continue this trend. See McCormick
v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263 (1880); Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286 (1877); McGuire v.
Carlyle, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 51 (1917).
90. 420 U.S. at 321.
91. Id. at 321-22; accord, Procunier v. Navarett, 98 S. Ct. 855 (1978).
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that developed in Thompson v. City of Louisville .92 It asked whether there
was support for the defendants' decision, not whether it seemed to them
that they were acting reasonably. 9 Furthermore, the Court sent the case
back to determine whether the plaintiff might have been denied a pro-
cedural due process right to a hearing, even though its opinions had not
specifically accorded this right to students at the time of the challenged
conduct. 94 Four members of the Court strenuously objected to this
weakening of Scheuer,95 and yet the language about "settled, indisputable
law," if considered apart from what the Court held, could be twisted and
applied so as to grant official immunity quite as broad as that found in
Scheuer.
This tension in the Wood decision had not been completely explored
when the Court confronted still another immunity case, Imbler v.
Pachtman .96 In Imbler the plaintiff alleged-and had proved in a prior suit
for federal habeas corpus97-that the defendant district attorney had know-
ingly used perjured testimony to secure plaintiff's conviction and death
sentence. A readily identifiable group of precedents generated under
Spalding argued for absolute immunity.98 On the other hand, despite their
ambiguities, Scheuer and Wood had made it clear that in section 1983
litigation absolute immunity could not be freely extended beyond judges
and legislators. One might reasonably have predicted a qualified immunity
in this case, small comfort for a defendant who had been accused of
having employed perjured testimony. Indeed, very recent decisions in-
volving prosecutors had begun to take what seemed the message in
Scheuer-Wood and had begun to ease away from Spalding.99
92. 362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
93. "Given the fact that there was evidence supporting the charge .... 420
U.S. at 326 (Court's emphasis).
94. See Theis, supra note 47, at 1017.
95. 420 U.S. at 329-31.
96. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
97. Imbler v. California, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865
(1970).
98. See notes 138-44, infra, and accompanying text.
99. See Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1976); Hahn v. Sargent, 523
F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1975); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Christman
v. Hanrahan, 500 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1974) (by implication); Holton v. Boman, 493
F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1974); Hilliard v. Williams, 465 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1029 (1972); Briggs v. Goodwin, 384 F. Supp. 1228 (D.D.C. 1974); Haaf v.
Grams, 355 F. Supp. 542 (D. Minn. 1973); Rousselle v. Perez, 293 F. Supp. 298
(E.D. La. 1968); Koch v. Grimminger, 192 Neb. 706, 223 N.W.2d 833 (1974);
Cashen v. Spann, 66 N.J. 541, 334 A.2d 8 (1975).
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Imbler confounded these predictions by granting prosecutors abso-
lute immunity. The Court's finding of absolute immunity might imply
awesome common law "tap roots." In fact, there are none. English law
granted no immunity. In truth, no case raises the narrow issue because at
that time official government lawyers had very little involvement in
criminal prosecutions. However, it is instructive to look at cases involving
private parties as well as their lawyers.
If policy arguments in favor of absolute protection for public prosecu-
tors have validity, they have at least equal strength when private citizens
perform-with government encouragement-the same task."0 If English
law gave no absolute immunity in this context, one could hardly infer that
Congress signified a substantial change with its "every person" language.
Only in relatively recent times has England created an official pro-
secuting authority, the Director of Public Prosecutions; and even now he
takes an immediate involvement in criminal prosecutions nothing like that
of an American district attorney. By and large, English prosecutions have
customarily been instituted on the complaints of private citizens or police
officers in their capacity as private citizens. It has been stressed that every
citizen has the right and duty to prosecute crime. At the preliminary
hearing level, the prosecuting witness often presented his case without
professional legal assistance, although he might hire a solicitor for this
purpose. Even in those cases in which the accused had been committed for
jury trial upon an indictment, the court commonly appointed a barrister at
the last minute to conduct the prosecution's case. Thus, in England,
official government lawyers have had much less control of the criminal
justice machinery than in the United States.10 1
A number of English defamation cases contain broad statements of an
absolute privilege for parties, witnesses, and counsel. 112 However, the
total protection against actions sounding in defamation should not obscure
a sensible and vigorously applied distinction: that such persons may be
liable for a malicious prosecution. The cases indicate that the law visited
liability on lawyers as well as non-lawyers in this latter type of action. The
100. Defense of a civil suit would be even more disruptive and costly for the
private citizen than for the public prosecutor.
101. See R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 105-14 (1940);
accord, Johnson v. Emerson, L.R. 6 Ex. 329, 372 (1871).
102. See Munster v. Lamb, 11 Q.B.D. 588 (C.A. 1883); Dawkins v. Lord
Rokeby, L.R. 8 Q.B. 255 (1873); Mackay v. Ford, 120 Rev. R. 831 (Ex. 1860);
Hodgson v. Scarlett, 106 Eng. Rep. 86 (K.B. 1818); Wood v. Gunston, 82 Eng. Rep.
863 (K.B. 1655); Brook v. Montague, 79 Eng. Rep. 77 (K.B. 1606).
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distinction seems justified if one considers that a privilege to defame
prevents a collateral attack on a prior judgment of conviction. However,
since, by definition, the prior proceedings must have terminated in favor
of the now plaintiff, 03 an action for malicious prosecution makes no
attack on a judgment of conviction."4
Floyd v. Barker itself carries the first hint of this distinction. 05
Shortly afterward, the Exchequer Chamber upheld a judgment in a mali-
cious prosecution action against the defendant who falsely attempted to
procure an indictment against the plaintiff. "0 That same Court pressed the
distinction to its furthest limit in an 1861 decision, Fitzjohn v. Mackin-
der, 107 where the defendant's perjury in a civil debt action set in motion an
ultimately unsuccessful criminal prosecution against the plaintiff. The
judge in the first civil case, believing the defendant, committed the
plaintiff for trial and ordered the defendant to prosecute. In the subsequent
malicious prosecution suit, the defendant argued that he had lied in order
to advance his position in the civil action, not to have the plaintiff
committed on criminal charges. His prosecution of the plaintiff, a role not
sought but imposed on him, resulted from the judge's finding of probable
cause. To this, Chief Justice Cockburn replied, "I cannot bring myself to
think that the defendant should be allowed to shelter himself under an
order having its origin in his own falsehood." 08 The defendant, relying
on defamation cases, also argued that there could be no action for perjured
testimony. Cockburn's reply is a classic statement of the distinction, even
now recognized in England. "o
[T]his is neither in form nor substance an action in respect of the
perjury . . . . It is an action for preferring an indictment and carry-
103. See I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 4.1-. 12 (1956) for the
elements of the action.
104. Failure to grasp this distinction accounts, in part, for some of the cases
examined in Imbler. See text accompanying notes 129 & 140, infra.
105. See 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1307 (1607).
106. Payne v. Porter, 79 Eng. Rep. 418 (Exch. Ch. 1619); accord, Mittens v.
Foreman, 58 L.J. (n.s.) 40 (Q.B.D. 1888); Heslop v. Chapman, 23 L.J. (n.s.) 49
(Exch. Ch. 1853); Dubois v. Keats, 113 Eng. Rep. 440 (K.B. 1840). Sutton v.
Johnston, 99 Eng. Rep. 1215 (Exch. Ch. 1786), denied an action for malicious
prosecution of a court-martial. However, the court's opinion makes clear that the
case turns on the unusual features of military law.
107. 142 Eng. Rep. 199 (Exch. Ch. 1861).
108. Id. at 208; accord, Johnson v. Emerson, L.R. 6 Ex. 329, 395 (1871).
109. Compare Roy v. Prior, [1971] A.C. 470 (H.L. 1970), with Marrinan v.




ing on a prosecution against the plaintiff on a charge which the
defendant knew to be untrue, and which he knew could only be
supported by perjured testimony. The perjury only comes incidental-
ly into question as shewing that the whole proceeding was malicious
and destitute of any pretence of probable cause.110
Significantly, Cockburn stresses in another portion of the opinion that
prosecution may become malicious in any of its stages, whenever the
prosecutor can no longer believe continuation of the prosecution jus-
tified. ' I
There is evidence that a similar liability for lawyers existed. Obvious-
ly, a lawyer was not vicariously liable for the malice of his client;... and
the nature of an action for wrongful use of legal process would often
frustrate recovery if the client had perpetrated a fraud on his own lawyer.
But lawyers certainly had no immunity from malicious use of the legal
machinery." 3 In the 1871 case of Johnson v. Emerson,114 though the
barons differed on the particular application of the general rule, they
agreed that, if the defendant lawyer "acted without reasonable and prob-
able cause and was actuated by malice he would be responsible in this
action, though he acted only as an attorney."" 5 To hold otherwise would
allow him license as a "legal assassin." 116
Against this background, no American decision before 1871 granted
the prosecutor absolute or qualified immunity. Parker v. Huntington,"17
an 1854 Massachusetts case which received only footnote treatment in
Imbler, has far more meaning than the Court was willing to attribute to
it. 118 In Parker, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, a leading
court in the recognition of legislative 19 and judicial 120 immunity as well as
110. 142 Eng. Rep. at 210.
111. Id. at 209.
112. See Brook v. Montague, 79 Eng. Rep. 77 (K.B. 1606).
113. See Melia v. Neate, 176 Eng. Rep. 347 (N.P. 1863); Stockley v. Hornidge,
173 Eng. Rep. 377 (N.P. 1837). That these cases, involving wrongful use of legal
process in a civil suit, are pertinent is explained in Johnson v. Emerson, L.R. 6 Ex.
329, 372-73 (1871).
114. L.R. 6 Ex. 329 (1871).
115. Id. at 333. Liability was imposed on the attorney by a divided court.
116. Id. at 368.
117. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 124 (1854).
118. 424 U.S. at 421 n. 18: "Parker . . . involved the elements of a malicious
prosecution cause of action rather than the immunity of a prosecutor."
119. See Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. (4 Tyng) 1 (1808), on which the Court relied in
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 203-04 (1881).
120. See Pratt v. Gardner, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 63 (1848), cited in Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
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a lawyer's privilege to defame in judicial proceedings, 21 discussed in
exceedingly narrow and detailed terms and remanded for further proceed-
ings a malicious prosecution action against the district attorney.1 22 Since
prosecutorial immunity would have provided a summary defense to allega-
tions that the district attorney had fabricated the criminal charges against
the civil plaintiff, the Parker court certainly pursued a tortured, arid
course,' if we assume that prosecutorial immunity was an available
ground of the decision. Indeed, that absolute immunity was not recognized
as a defense seems a more straightforward characterization of the Mas-
sachusetts court's perception of contemporary legal principles. On an
issue so important and so decisive of this case as well as many others,
silence hardly indicates that the issue was an open one, as Imbler attempts
to imply.
Indeed, as late as 1892, a standard treatise on malicious prosecution
and related subjects 24 makes no mention of prosecutorial immunity.
Likewise, an 1891 treatise on public officers 125 gives a full discussion of
official immunities, including "quasi-judicial" immunities for a wide
range of officials, but makes no mention of prosecuting attorneys. Without
doubt, a lawyer had strong defenses for his conduct in initiating and
121. In 1841, the Massachusetts court clearly recognized the defamation
privilege for lawyers and witnesses established by the English cases. Hoar v.
Wood, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 193 (1841). There is not the slightest indication that the
Court was willing to ignore the other line of cases on malicious prosecution (see
notes 102-16, supra, and accompanying text) rooted in the same soil and inter-
twined with the defamation cases.
122. Impliedly, defendant-prosecutor's initial success in his criminal prosecution
supplied sufficient probable cause to defeat a necessary element of plaintiff's case
for malicious prosecution. See Parker v. Farley, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 279 (1852),
cited by the court, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 128; Bacon v. Towne, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.)
217 (1849). Thus, the court would take a view of the elements of that tort different
from courts in England, see Fitzjohn v. Mackinder, 142 Eng. Rep. 199 (Exch. Ch.
1861), and in California, see Carpenter v. Sibley, 153 Cal. 215, 94 P. 879 (1908); see
note 134, infra. However, like these courts, it places no reliance on immunity, a
doctrine which would foreclose civil suit even when the prosecutor had met with no
success in the criminal proceeding.
123. The court's opinion contains a lengthy exposition of the nature of the cause
of action for conspiracy and its relation to the cause of action for malicious
prosecution. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 126-28.
124. See M. NEWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
FALSE IMPRISONMENT, AND THE ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESS §§ 18-20 (1892); I.T.
STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 37-38 (1906) (discusses official immuni-
ty but makes no mention of public prosecutors).
125. See F. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFI-
CERS §§ 636-43 (1890).
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conducting criminal and civil litigation. 126 However, nothing so all-power-
ful as an immunity appears in the reports until 1896.
In that year Griffith v. Slinkard127 adopted the novel position that a
public prosecutor should receive absolute immunity. The Indiana Supreme
Court's analysis merits some attention. Drawing upon dicta in a prior
case 128 interpreting a statute forbidding bribery of officials engaged in the
administration of justice, the court characterized the prosecutor as a
judicial officer. Then, quoting from a textbook passage on liability for
defamation, 129 it concluded that judicial officers had immunity for all their
official activities. 130 Parker v. Huntington 131 was interpreted as consistent
with a proposition of absolute immunity.
This remarkable decision did not gain immediate approval. 132 In 1908
the California Supreme Court remanded for trial allegations that a district
attorney conspired to bring knowingly false charges, which resulted in a
conviction, which itself was reversed on appeal. 33 Without mention of
official immunity, the court rejected the district attorney's argument that
the conviction, albeit reversed, conclusively negated want of probable
cause, an essential element of malicious prosecution. The court
responded,
Certainly, if a man has procured an unjust judgment by the
knowing use of false and perjured testimony, he has perpetrated a
great private wrong against his adversary . . . . [I]t would be ob-
noxious to every one's sense of right and justice to say that, because
the infamy had been successful to the result of a conviction, the
probable cause for the prosecution was thus conclusively established
against a man who had thus been doubly wronged. 1
34
126. See, e.g., Bicknell v. Dorion, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 478 (1835); Peck v.
Chouteau, 91 Mo. 138, 3 S.W. 577 (1887).
127. 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896).
128. State v. Henning, 33 Ind. 189 (1870).
129. J. TOWNSHEND, A TREATISE ON SLANDER AND LIBEL § 227 (3d ed. 1877).
130. The court was seemingly unaware of the English doctrine discussed in the
text accompanying notes 102-16, supra. Nor was this doctrine local to England, see
Hastings v. Lick, 22 Wend. 410, 417 (N.Y. 1839).
131. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 124 (1854), discussed in text accompanying notes 117-23,
supra.
132. See Arnold v. Hubble, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 947, 38 S.W. 1041 (1897).
133. Carpenter v. Sibley, 153 Cal. 215, 94 P. 879 (1908).
134. Id. at 218, 94 P. at 880. Some years later, an intermediate appellate court in
California, facilely characterizing Sibley as a case that left the issue of prosecutorial
immunity as undecided, upheld such immunity. Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d
277, 286, 44 P.2d 592, 596 (1935). This is, of course, similar to the approach taken by
the Court in Imbler. See note 118, supra, and accompanying text.
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Decisions in Hawaii 35 and in Minnesota 136 also refused to grant the
prosecutor an absolute immunity.1 37
Prosecutorial immunity, however, eventually took hold in four
states. 138 It gained momentum, when, in 1926, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, stressing defamation cases, but failing to reconcile them with
malicious prosecution cases, 139 approved the doctrine in Yaselli v.
Goff,"' a suit against a federal prosecutor. The decision was summarily
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court,'' which assured its ready
acceptance by state"' and federal courts, 143 even in section 1983 suits
against state prosecutors," 44 where the interpretation of section 1983
makes the special demands previously indicated.
Thus, prosecutorial immunity has no "tap roots" in the centuries
preceding 1871. Rather, the doctrine, especially as enunciated in Yaselli,
fits smoothly into the pattern of federal decisions which, since the turn-of-
the-century decision in Spalding v. Vilas ,'14 have extended immunity to
numerous officials. 1,4s
135. Leong Yau v. Carden, 23 Haw. 362 (1916).
136. Skeffington v. Eylward, 97 Minn. 244, 105 N.W. 638 (1906).
137. Ostman v. Bruere, 141 Mo. App. 240, 124 S.W. 1059 (1910), although
denying liability after an investigation of plaintiff's claim, makes no mention of
immunity.
138. See Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115, 165 P. 663 (1917); Semmes v. Collins,
120 Miss. 265, 82 So. 145 (1919); Price v. Cook, 120 Okla. 105, 250 P. 519 (1926);
Watts v. Gerking, 111 Ore. 641, 222 P. 318 (1924).
139. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 402-03 (2d Cir. 1926).
140. 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926).
141. 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
142. E.g., Downey v. Allen, 36 Cal. App. 2d 269, 97 P.2d 515 (1939); Andersen
v. Bishop, 304,Mass. 396, 23 N.E.2d 1003 (1939); Kittler v. Kelsch, 56 N.D. 227, 216
N.W. 898 (1927); Anderson v. Manley, 181 Wash. 327, 43 P.2d 39 (1935). See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 656 (1938). But see authorities in note 99, supra.
143. E.g., Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 981 (1965); Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 642, rehearing denied, 305 U.S. 673 (1938), 307 U.S. 651 (1939); Anderson v.
Rohrer, 3 F. Supp. 367 (S.D. Fla. 1933).
144. E.g., Duba v. McIntyre, 501 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1974); Guerro v. Mulhearn,
498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892
(3d Cir. 1972); Madison v. Gerstein, 440 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1971); Kauffman v.
Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970); Marlowe v.
Coakley, 404 F.2d 70 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1968); Fanale v. Sheehy,
385 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1967); Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 868, rehearing denied, 370 U.S. 920 (1962); Stift v. Lynch, 267
F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959). The cases are collected in C. ANTINEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTS: CIVIL PRACTICE § 40 (1971 & Supp. 1975).
145. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
146. See 12 F.2d at 404 (reliance on Spalding).
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The Court's methodology in Imbler bears consideration. It is so
unusual that one can hardly guess what will happen in the future. The
Court stressed that it must consider the immunity accorded the relevant
official at common law and the interests behind that immunity. Glossing
over the non-existence of prosecutorial immunity until 1896,147 it recount-
ed the twentieth-century development of this doctrine, without recognizing
the influence of Spalding, now diminishing under the influence of
Scheuer- Wood.'4 Thus, it concluded that, "historically," '4 9 this immu-
nity was "well-settled."' 5 ° As argued earlier, it would be plausible to
make a narrow inquiry into the state of immunity for each official as of
1871 and, hearkening to legislative intent, grant or deny the immunity as
the common law of that vintage would have granted or denied it. But to
make the existence of immunity rely on a "weight of authority" calcula-
tion limited to modern cases is hopelessly confused.
Even the Court must have realized that such an inquiry has little to do
with the problem of statutory interpretation facing it, for it justified
prosecutorial immunity in material part on the policy reasons which
Spalding proposed for a general theory of official immunity. 5' Of course,
by saying that it was making a decision on prosecutorial immunity, not
immunity for all officials, the Court may have hoped that it had escaped its
fear that "every person" might be transformed into "no person." And
certainly it did not overrule Scheuer-Wood. However, if the experience
under Spalding teaches a lesson, that lesson is the inexorable march of
absolute immunity. Indeed, if the approved methodology now requires
that, for each class of officials, precedents between Spalding and
Scheuer- Wood be "weighed" or "counted," it will produce and continue
the widespread immunity that has prevailed during most of this century for
federal officials. 152
HISTORY AT ODDS WITH POLICY?
Earlier in the article this author maintained that a narrow, historical
approach to immunity would be demonstrated superior to an analogical
147. See note 118, supra, and accompanying text.
148. See cases cited in note 99, supra.
149. 424 U.S. at 421.
150. Id. at 424.
151. Id. at 424-25. The Court also opined that prosecutorial misconduct raises
issues for a lay jury which it may not be as well-equipped to handle as the issues in
suits against other officials. However, it is difficult to understand why a jury, as -in
Scheuer, would not have infinitely greater difficulty in evaluating a governor's
decision to call national guardsmen into action.
152. See text accompanying notes 65-69, supra.
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approach to immunity. On one level that task has been accomplished.
Appeals to broad analogy clash with the historical background of the
"every person" language. The early cases provide guidance in interpret-
ing a legislative intent not faithfully carried forward in the Court's most
recent pronouncements.
Nevertheless, these recent cases evidence a judicial mentality with
which we must reckon as if there were no statute on the scene. These
decisions reflect a determined distaste for the imposition of liability on
public officials. In the face of this determination, careful analysis of the
historical background might be dismissed as pedantry insensitive to
compelling policy considerations. This determination, strong enough to
conjure up doubt and complexity even in the face of the most pre-emptive
language imaginable, must be confronted. If widespread immunity is good
policy, then it will persist regardless of the legitimate claim that it trans-
gresses legislative intent.
Since Scheuer, Wood, and Imbler seem to take approaches to im-
munity divergent from each other as well as from Congressional intent, it
is useful to examine the wisdom of each variation. Imbler's absolute
immunity most starkly and perhaps most coherently presents the policy
considerations at issue on the immunity question. Imbler's iron-clad
assurance that lawsuits against the public official will be summarily
dismissed grants him a latitude for the effective performance of duties
deemed on the whole beneficial to society at large. Through malice,
incompetence, or error in judgment, he may cause injury to a number of
citizens. Yet he need not concern himself about lawsuits, which expose
him to a risk of liability and thereby make less attractive a vigorous
discharge of his important duties.' 5 3 This utilitarian calculation ordains
that a few shall suffer without redress, so that the many may realize a
greater benefit. One human endeavor, the governance of society, is
deemed so important that it merits a radical measure like total immunity,
which, with few and ever decreasing exceptions, is denied to almost all
other activities. 54
Clearly, total immunity for tortious conduct defeats the ordinary aims
of tort law-retribution, compensation, and deterrence."55 There may
153. See the Learned Hand formulation, quoted in note 69, supra.
154. The once widespread immunity of charities is now recognized in only a
handful of jurisdictions. See W. PROSSER, supra note 66, § 133, at 994-95. Inter-
spousal immunity, although slightly less moribund, is under increasing judicial
attack. See id. § 122, at 863-64.
155. Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 137
(1951) sets out a lucid, general survey of tort theory.
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always be a legitimate difference of opinion on the value question whether
fearless, effective government is worth denial of these traditional goals of
tort law. The narrower criticism to be made is that a society may grant
redress to wronged citizens without diminishing the appeal of public
service. If the governmental employer provides full indemnity for the
wrongdoing public servant, the latter may pursue vigorous action without
fear of financial responsibility for his illegal actions. Nor need the citizen
suffer a wrong without redress. There is no reason to forego the traditional
aims of tort law when the goal of effective government may be neverthe-
less obtained. Total immunity constitutes an overreaction which fails to
accommodate the needs of the wronged individual. It places on a few the
costs of an endeavor beneficial to all.
Governmental indemnity for official misconduct, especially for in-
tentional misconduct, may seem objectionable at first glance. The law has
traditionally granted indemnity only to a party less culpable than the party
paying the indemnity. 156 That a totally innocent party, a governmental
unit, should pay indemnity to a wrongdoing official may seem somewhat
novel, perhaps even shocking. Only a few states by statute grant indemni-
ty to public officers, and then only to those who have acted in good
faith. 57 However, this traditionally strict view of indemnity should not
allow us to forget that absolute immunity, like indemnity, relieves the
wrongdoer from financial responsibility, but, unlike indemnity, places the
ultimate burden on the victim of the wrongdoer. If a society has granted
total immunity, it has already determined to forego tort responsibility for
governmental officials. Replacing immunity with indemnity represents no
basic change on this issue. It merely substitutes redress for the innocent
victim, who, under an immunity framework, is left to bear a burden for the
good of the rest of society even though the society has the financial
resources to bear that burden.
The same protection may be given the citizen if individual immunity
for the official is retained, but sovereign immunity abolished and vicarious
responsibility imposed. Rather than sue the individual defendant, who
would obtain indemnity from his employer, the citizen would directly sue
the employer, who would not be allowed to invoke an immunity personal
to the employee. 158 Within this framework, official immunity would work
156. See W. PROSSER, supra note 66, § 51.
157. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 825.2 (1973).
158. See Kattan, supra note 1, at 995-1002; Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers:
Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers'
Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447 (1978).
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no injustice on the wronged citizen. Congress appears to have taken this
approach in extending governmental responsibility for the torts of federal
law enforcement officials. '59 It remains to be seen whether Congress or the
Court will take a similar approach to the sovereign immunity of states and
their subdivisions. 160 Until then, official immunity will remain an unfair
allocation of burdens.
Scheuer's more flexible approach to immunity commends itself as
good policy even less than does the Imbler doctrine. The open-ended,
amorphous inquiry into reasonableness and good faith mandated in
Scheuer provides no sure protection for the public official. On the whole,
he will probably win more lawsuits than he will lose.' 61 But the test
inherently carries an element of uncertainty not present in Imbler and
might encourage settlement without trial or might even lead to liability in
cases which would be summarily dismissed under Imbler. Moreover,
although the public official's interest is considerably impaired, the citizen
gains little real benefit. Unless he can effectively rebut claims of rea-
sonableness and good faith, he will suffer uncompensated losses. The
injustice of unredressed deprivations of civil rights seems particularly
senseless when the public official has no assurance of immunity.
There is a more subtle disadvantage of Scheuer which may be felt
over the passage of time if the Court should settle upon Scheuer's
formulation of immunity doctrine. Traditionally, the tort suit not only has
compensated the wronged citizen and deterred the public official, but also
has fleshed out the governing principles of constitutional law. This de-
claratory function of the tort suit may be impaired under Scheuer. If the
official, ultimately, need not act within the law, but only within a good
faith, reasonable understanding of the law, the courts may be able to
sidestep authoritative resolution of difficult or doubtful legal questions. 1
62
159. See Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Va. 1977).
160. Whether Congress or the Court may impose such liability is a substantial
topic beyond the bounds of this article. Compare Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), with Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977) and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
161. See Newman, supra note 158, at 460-61.
162. Consider Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974), in which wrongful
death damages were denied because the previously unchallenged existence of the
state statute in question was thought to establish a good faith defense. Only the
additional prayer for declaratory relief was thought to force the court to confront
the constitutionality of the statute in question. And in this regard the Supreme
Court later reversed the Eighth Circuit, ruling that declaratory relief was inapprop-
riate. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977).
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Wood's seemingly stricter interpretation of reasonableness can be
taken as a change from traditional notions on accountability in one major
respect. As we saw earlier, the test, in the context of the facts of the case,
appears to allow little leeway for official error, especially on questions of
law, and maintains a stringent standard of official accountability. This
rigidity poses no serious threat to wronged plaintiffs, but surely precludes
peace of mind for the government official. Indeed, the opinion seems to
leave open liability for conduct which is normally lawful, but which may
be converted into unlawful conduct if the plaintiff can show actual ill-will
or bad motivation for the challenged conduct. Curiously, this would
represent adoption of the very doctrine rejected in Spalding. This theory
of liability carries the broadest possibility of liability and resultant de-
bilitating effects on the public official, and yet for no compelling reason it
retains small pockets of non-liability.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
At this point the Court's dilemma must seem insoluble. It wants
immunity, but not too much. Its problems with the statutory interpretation
mirror a more fundamental contrariety of disposition. It wants constitu-
tional protections for the citizens, even some newly found protections,' 63
but cannot always bear to direct the sting of those rights at the government
officials who deny them. 164 If it could direct that sting at the governmental
employer, it would probably show much less fascination with circumvent-
ing the "every person" language. Efforts to deal with this problem
through the use of immunity doctrine have utterly failed. If the Court
insists upon retaining Tenney, it should return to the original conception of
the case: protection of immunities well-known to the 1871 Congress. This
task may seem artificial and distasteful, unworthy of a Court so identified
with creative leadership; but the alternative has already proven itself more
unsatisfying.
163. Scheuer expanded the basis of liability while creating a new immunity
doctrine. Consider also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), in which the
Court expanded liability, but remanded for a new trial in light of Wood. Perhaps
there is a parallel here with the Court's development of prospective-only applica-
tion of constitutional rights in criminal cases. The prospective application doctrine
has been argued to permit the development of new rights which the Court would be
reluctant to develop if full application were given. See Haddad, "Retroactivity
Should Be Rethought": A Call for the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 417 (1969).
164. Compare Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422-23 (1975) with
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975).
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